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Abstract
Neither the presence of Australian foreign fighters 
overseas nor sectarian-related security concerns in 
Australia are entirely new to this country. However, 
the current issues surrounding Australian jihadists 
fighting in Syria and Iraq are qualitatively different. 
These foreign fighters have a simplistic worldview 
that divides the world into those who believe and 
those that don’t, and seeks the establishment of an 
Islamic state that is at best a chimera. They represent 
a security threat to Australia. The Australian 
Government has instituted a series of preventative 
programs and punitive measures to dissuade 
would-be fighters, but despite this their numbers 
have grown. Islamic community leaders have been 
slow to respond to the ideological threat in a timely, 
unequivocal and appropriate manner compared 
to those advocating jihad. Australia’s Muslim 
leaders need to understand and a cknowledge 
the nature of the threat, the ways in which their 
youth are being influenced, and to be more 
proactive, focused and public in their construction 
and dissemination of a counter-narrative.
Introduction
The nature of our security threats is rarely easily 
foretold. Thousands of analysts spend millions of 
hours trying to assess what represents the main 
threats to citizens. It is a difficult task, given the 
number of variables that are involved in predicting 
the future. State-on-state conflict is the traditional 
stock-in-trade, but is becoming less and less 
common, even though some security analysts 
prophesise a near - inevitable clash between a rising 
China and the United States. For others, the era 
of cyber threat is the new way in which state-on-
state conflict is played out. Nationalist struggles—
certainly one of the main motivators for conflict 
since the end of the Second World War—continue 
to bedevil the world, as the dispute between Russia 
and the Ukraine attests. The threat of nuclear 
conflict, with the exception of possible Iranian-driven 
proliferation, has even been relegated to a second-
order security issue. Yet it is one of the oldest 
and most persistent sources of conflict, sectarian 
identity and its attendant predisposition towards 
religiously motivated violence, that has remained one 
of the primary security concerns for the West for 
more than a decade. Yet, for a threat that bedevils 
analysts and represents an unambiguous danger 
to Australians, the issue of sectarian identity rarely 
features as an explicit security threat, more often 
than not being couched in terms of a general terrorist 
threat in the same way that nationalist, anarchist, 
or white supremacist threats are portrayed. 
But religious intolerance and its consequent 
invocation of God to justify persecuting or killing 
others because of their religious identity (or lack 
thereof), remains a persistent global phenomenon. 
It has led to the deaths of thousands of Westerners 
and tens, if not hundreds of thousands of non-
Westerners since September 2001. Whether it is 
religious violence in Nigeria, intra-communal violence 
in Pakistan, Iraq and Syria, or the persecution of 
Rohingya Muslims by elements of the majority 
Buddhist population in Burma, there are few areas 
of the world where religious identity is not an 
influencing factor. Sectarian violence is also not 
confined to mainstream religions. We should not 
forget that religious groups were responsible for the 
Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo underground in 1995, 
while the standoff with the Branch Davidians—a 
breakaway group of Christians originally with 
Seventh Day Adventist roots—at Waco, Texas, 
in 1993 killed more than 80 people. Religiously 
motivated violence is a multi-faceted security threat. 
For most Western countries, the ongoing threat 
from religious violence is largely anomalous to 
the increasing secularization of those societies. In 
the past decade, census data from Canada has 
shown the proportion of the population claiming to 
have no religion has risen from 16 to 24 per cent, 
in England and Wales from 15 to 25 per cent, and 
between 2001 and 2006 the percentage of New 
Zealanders professing to have no religion rose 
from 30 to 35 per cent.1 Australia has followed 
this trend, with 22 per cent of people reporting 
no religion in the 2011 census; in the 1911 census 
1 Australian Social Trends November 2013, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4102.0Main+Features30N
ov+2013, accessed 25 May 2014.
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only 0.4 per cent reported the same. Although 
religion rarely enters the public discourse in this 
country, that still leaves four out of five Australians 
professing to have a religious identity. When the 
subject of religion is considered publicly, it is often 
presented in a negative light. Such is the dominance 
of secular interests in much of the commentariat, 
that the former High Court Justice Dyson Heydon 
was moved recenly in a speech to the Centre for 
Independent Studies to talk of a new sectarianism in 
Australia in which ‘there may be a new anti-Catholic 
movement particularly among our intellectuals.’2   
For such a persistent security threat, religion and 
religious identity is rarely seen by security analysts 
and architects as a potential danger in its own 
right. It is difficult to obtain from publicly available 
government documents a sense of the degree to 
which religious motivation constitutes a threat, in 
either absolute or relative terms. Australia’s 2010 
Terrorism White Paper noted the centrality of radical 
Islam to the threat of terrorism in Australia. However, 
the 2013 National Security Statement went no further 
than making a banal observation in its section on 
‘Broader Global Challenges with National Security 
Implications’ concerning the potential for religiously 
motivated violence: “Disparities in wealth and 
opportunities, and ethnic and religious differences 
more generally may affect social cohesion and 
cause unrest.”3 The ASIO annual report to parliament 
is more forthright in outlining the terrorist threat 
to Australia posed by radical Islamists.4 A much 
more useful measure of the degree to which 
religiously motivated violence is a security threat 
can be gleaned from the EU Terrorism Situation and 
Trend Report 2013 (TE-SAT 2013) that provides a 
detailed breakdown of the specific characteristics 
of each terrorist act in the EU during 2012, including 
a section on religiously inspired terrorism.5  
2 ‘Catholics victims of new racism’, The Australian, 12 April 2014, http://www.
theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/catholics-victims-of-new-racism/story-
fn59niix-1226881416273#, accessed 25 May 2014.
3 National Security Statement p 31.
4 ASIO Annual Report to Parliament 2012-2013, 31 October 2013, http://www.
asio.gov.au/img/files/ASIO-Report-to-Parliament-2012-13.pdf, accessed 9 
June 2013.
5 Europol TE-SAT 2013, European Police Office 2013, https://www.europol.
europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/europol_te-sat2013_lr_0.pdf
While the majority of large-scale contemporary 
sectarian conflict is centred on the Middle East, 
the proliferation of social media outlets, ease of 
travel and growth of diasporic communities has 
meant that people are connected to and identify 
with groups with whom they have a shared 
identity in ways unimaginable a generation ago. 
In describing the sense of nationalism that bound 
people together with a shared identity even though 
they would likely never physically meet each 
other, Benedict Anderson spoke of ‘imagined 
communities’.6 The improved connectivity available 
to people from many countries nowadays has 
meant that such ‘imagined communities’ are even 
easier to create, and in more ways than they were 
when Anderson coined the phrase in1983. 
So while religious conflict is hardly a new 
phenomenon, thanks to the information revolution—
and particularly the growth in the reach and 
capabilities of social media—sectarianism is 
emerging as one of the greatest contemporary 
security challenges, and one of the most persistent 
that we face. Such is the international concern 
at the prospect of ongoing religiously motivated 
violence that in November 2013 the Iranian 
foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif posited 
that the sectarian tensions between Sunnis and 
Shi‘a is ‘the most serious security threat not only 
to the region but also to the world at large.’7
In testifying before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations in March 2014 regarding 
the Syrian conflict, Deputy Secretary of State 
William Burns stated that ‘these [foreign] 
fighters, mostly Sunni extremists, represent a 
long-term threat to US security interests.’8  
These senior government officials are right in 
highlighting the security threat posed by the current 
6 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism, Verso, London, 1983, p 49.
7 ‘Iran FM: Sectarian strife is worst threat in world’, BBC News, 11 November 
2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24893808, accessed 24 
March 2014.
8 William J Burns testimony to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs on 
‘Syria spillover: the Growing Threat of Terrorism and Sectarianism in the Middle 
East and Ukraine Update,’ Washington DC, 6 March 2014, http://www.state.
gov/s/d/2014/223030.htm, accessed 25 May 2014.
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round of sectarian conflict. That is because the latest 
sectarian security threat is qualitatively different 
from what constituted sectarian conflict in the past. 
Today, radical Islamist terrorist groups such as ISIS, 
al-Qa‘ida or any of its variants pose a singularly 
problematic threat. Unlike other state-based or 
nationalist security threats, these groups have no 
demands that are conceivably negotiable; they 
demand freedom of action in the areas they seek to 
control, but also promote a pan-nationalist agenda 
that has no realistic hope of being achieved. Their 
religious fanaticism divides the world into simplistic 
perceptions of believers and non-believers and 
allows the targeting of the latter. Such labeling means 
that Westerners and their allies can be attacked 
for being either Christian or secular, while fellow 
Muslims can be killed if they fall outside the jihadists’ 
narrow definition of what a true believer constitutes. 
Australia’s past experience 
of sectarian threats
Sectarianism has long been a feature of Australian 
society, but until the mid-nineteenth century it 
largely reflected the centuries-old divide between 
Irish Catholics and English Protestants. The security 
fear of the Irish Catholics’ presence in Australia was 
prevailingly a response to Irish nationalism rather 
than due to irreconcilable doctrinal or devotional 
differences. This concern was partly informed by 
the numbers of Australians of Irish heritage and 
the fear that they could mobilise their significant 
numbers if motivated to do so. There was certainly 
a great deal of sympathy for Irish nationalism among 
Australians prior to federation. On the centenary 
of the 1798 Uprising against the British in Ireland, 
the body of Michael Dwyer—a well-regarded local 
leader of the rebellion in County Wicklow who 
was subsequently transported to New South 
Wales—and that of his wife were moved from 
their original resting place in Devonshire Street to 
Waverley Cemetery. A memorial to Dwyer and other 
rebels was built at the cemetery and his reburial 
was enormous by any standards: the reinterment 
procession consisted of 400 carriages and 10,000 
people, who were watched by a crowd of 100,000. 
During the First World War Catholics were a large 
but under-represented minority amongst the all-
volunteer 1st AIF. Regardless, the suspicions 
concerning sectarian loyalty lay close to the 
surface. The leading role played by Cardinal Daniel 
Mannix—Archbishop of Melbourne, renowned 
for his role in the anti-conscription debate—led 
some to believe that British Protestant values and 
loyalty to the crown needed to be upheld and led 
to the formation of the Loyalty League in 1918. 
This was motivated in part by the feeling that Irish 
Catholics posed a security threat to Australia.9 The 
later partition of Ireland and maturing of Australian 
society largely put an end to a view of the Irish—and 
hence Catholics—as a possible security threat.
Australia and secto-
nationalist threats
Australia has not been immune from sectarian-
related terrorist actions. However, in most cases 
the religious identity of perpetrators has been 
informed by a broader political agenda. The Turkish 
consul-general in Australia and his bodyguard were 
assassinated by two gunmen from the ‘Justice 
Commandos of the Armenian Genocide’ in Sydney in 
December 1980, while an unsuccessful bomb attack 
on the Turkish Consulate in Melbourne in 1986 killed 
one of the bombers from the Armenian Revolutionary 
Front. While Christian faith is an essential element 
of Armenian identity, both of these attacks were 
part of a broader program defined by Armenian 
nationalist groups who were to varying degrees 
advocating Turkish acknowledgment of the Armenian 
genocide and the creation of a Greater Armenia 
that would comprise parts of eastern Turkey.  
The double bomb attack against the Israeli consulate 
and the Hakoah Club in Sydney in 1982 allegedly 
involved members of the Palestinian 15 May 
Movement, who were supported by some local 
accomplices, although nobody has been convicted 
in relation to the attacks. Once again, while religion 
was an element of the identity of those targeting 
9 J. Oxley, The Founding of the Tasmanian Loyalty League, University of 
Tasmania Honours thesis, 1974, http://www.utas.edu.au/library/companion_
to_tasmanian_history/L/Loyalty%20League.htm, accessed 12 February 2014.
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both an Israeli institution and a Jewish club, their 
motivations were largely nationalist. Even the group’s 
name has political rather than religious significance, 
given that it refers to the date on which the British 
mandate in Palestine ended. Of particular interest 
though is the way in which the Sunni Muslim 
members of the attack team appear to have been 
supported by Shi‘a Muslims in Australia. The only 
person brought before a court over the matter—
although he was granted a ‘no bill’ decision and 
his case never went to trial—was Muhammad Ali 
Beydoun,10 who had been born in Bint Jbail, a Shi’a 
Muslim town in southern Lebanon. In this case, the 
Palestinian bomber’s nationalist agenda coincided 
with those connected to southern Lebanon who 
sought a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the area 
they had invaded in 1982. Practical political agendas 
between Palestinian Sunnis and Lebanese Shi’a 
initiated the cooperative relationship that developed.
There have been other isolated examples of such 
secto-nationalist security threats, the best known of 
which were Croatian nationalists. Their Catholicism 
was a defining element of their Croatian identity; 
however, their opposition was to the Yugoslav 
government, which they saw as an illegitimate 
entity dominated by Serbs. The most significant 
incident involving Croatian nationalists was the 
alleged plans for a bombing campaign against 
targets in Sydney in 1978 by a group that came 
to be known as the ‘Croatian Six’. There have 
been subsequent claims, however, that the whole 
incident was concocted by Yugoslav intelligence.11 
Australians as foreign fighters
Prior to the current sectarian conflicts in Syria and 
Iraq, Australians have travelled to other people’s 
wars in order to fight. The most well-known of them 
were the more than 70 Australians who fought 
in the Spanish civil war in the 1930s, largely as 
10 ‘Thirty years later police hunt for bombers’, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 August 
2012 http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/thirty-years-later-police-hunt-for-bombers-
20120825-24t5t.html, accessed 25 May 2014.
11 Hamish McDonald, ‘Framed: the untold story of the Croatian six’, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 11 February 2012, http://www.smh.com.au/national/framed-
the-untold-story-about-the-croatian-six-20120210-1smum.html, accessed 26 
May 2014.
committed socialists or communists, sometimes 
as adventurers fighting for the Republicans and 
in one case, as a Catholic fighting for Franco’s 
Nationalist forces against what he believed were 
Godless communists.12 A crowd of more than 3,000 
people greeted some of the returnees when they 
arrived back in Sydney. Unlike today’s cohort of 
Australian ‘foreign fighters’ though, they were not 
necessarily considered a security threat to Australia 
on their return. This was largely due to the fact that 
as leftists they saw themselves as fighting against 
the existential threat they considered to derive 
from the narrow nationalist agenda of fascism. As 
it transpired, Australia was engaged in the same 
struggle against fascism within a few years. 
Australians of Croatian heritage also took up arms 
against the Yugoslav government. The most famous 
incident involved a group of 15 Australians belonging 
to the right-wing extremist Croatian Revolutionary 
Brotherhood, who undertook basic military training 
in Australia before travelling to Germany with the 
rather quixotic aim of infiltrating Yugoslavia in order to 
initiate an anti-communist armed uprising, which they 
believed was ripe for development.13 They entered 
Yugoslavia in 1972 with four other Croatians and 
began operating in the mountains of central Bosnia 
until they were targeted by the Yugoslav army. Over 
a period of several weeks, 15 were killed. Three 
others were subsequently executed after a trial, while 
one was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment.
Global Jihad and sectarianism
The global jihadist movement represents the most 
dangerous form of sectarian security threat. It is 
certainly unlike anything witnessed in the recent 
past, because it has eschewed the concept of 
the nation-state in favour of a broad religious 
community. National identity in this case becomes 
something transient at best; temporal loyalties 
as far as they exist are subordinated to religious 
identity. Unlike sectarian security threats in the past, 
12 http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/bull-joseph-nugent-palmer-12827, accessed 
7 July 2014.
13 Paul Hockenos, Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars, 
Cornell University Press, USA, 2003, p 60.
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these actors do not view their religious identity 
as an element of a broader nationalist agenda, 
with the exception of groups such as ISIS, which 
maintain a vision of an Islamic state. National 
boundaries are of little import to them other than 
for administrative purposes; indeed in the case of 
ISIS they have publicly sought to redraw national 
boundaries. For true jihadists there is no secular 
agenda around which one can negotiate. In practical 
terms there is no real negotiable outcome.
The international jihadist movement has morphed 
from its beginnings in 1980s Afghanistan, when 
many in the West saw it as an ally in the global 
standoff between the two competing political 
ideologies of the Cold War. The piousness and strict 
Islamic religious interpretation of the combatants 
was not seen as the harbinger of a security threat 
to the West. To be fair, at the time the activities of 
the Islamist fighters appeared to be geographically 
contained, and the message they carried specific 
to a particular set of geopolitical circumstances. 
The West’s acknowledgment that the security 
landscape has changed is evident in the attitude 
towards Islamists in the Syrian conflict: while the 
Assad regime is excoriated by Western and Arab 
governments alike, President Obama has noted that 
the security threat to Western interests from the crisis 
comes from the ‘battle-hardened extremist groups’.14 
In a generation and a half, jihadists have gone 
from being ‘the enemy of my enemy’ to simply 
‘the enemy’. This is due in large part to the way 
in which transport and communication links have 
allowed the exchange of people and information to 
occur ever more rapidly. The impact of social media 
in encouraging the development of a separate, 
idealised sectarian identity cannot be understated. 
In 1978 Ayatollah Khomeini was able to play on 
key elements of Shi‘a historiography in order to 
mobilise large elements of the Iranian population 
against the Shah’s government. He did this in 
14 Transcript of President Obama’s speech, Washington Post, 29 May 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-
commencement-address-at-west-point/2014/05/28/cfbcdcaa-e670-11e3-
afc6-a1dd9407abcf_story.html, accessed 6 June 2014.
part through what we now see as the antediluvian 
method of smuggling in and copying cassette tapes 
with recordings of his speeches. Nowadays the 
proliferation of social media outlets has meant that 
information, including the most emotive of imagery, 
can be relayed nearly instantaneously to a global 
audience. President Obama’s May 2014 West Point 
speech noted how the ‘24-hour news and social 
media makes it impossible to ignore the continuation 
of sectarian conflicts…that might have received only 
passing notice a generation ago.’15 The creation of 
a supra-national identity has never been easier.   
The Syrian and Iraqi conflicts have brought 
the concept of identity and sectarianism to the 
forefront of Australian security concerns. Although 
notoriously difficult to quantify accurately, there 
are now thousands of foreign fighters in Syria and 
Iraq. At the time of writing the government believed 
that there were about 60 Australians fighting and 
another 150 being monitored for providing support 
to fighters in Syria, or intending to travel there.16 The 
fear, of course, is that those who travel to Syria or 
Iraq to fight will have gained skills that can readily 
be used to conduct terrorist attacks in their home 
countries, and even more importantly that they 
and support elements will have made connections 
with other Islamists that may be used in years to 
come to facilitate attacks elsewhere. This was the 
consequence of the Afghan foreign fighter diaspora, 
and security authorities are alert to the need to 
prevent such a reoccurrence.17 Of equal concern 
is that any returnees from Syria may accrue status 
in their home communities for having fought in 
defence of Islam in countries of historical significance 
to the faith. Currently, more than half of the British 
domestic intelligence terrorism investigations 
conducted by MI5 involve Britons who have 
15 Ibid.
16 ‘George Brandis flags spy law changes, pledges to protect Australia from 
returning jihadists’, The Australian, 2 July 2014. http://www.theaustralian.com.
au/national-affairs/policy/george-brandis-flags-spy-law-changes-pledges-to-
protect-australia-from-returning-jihadists/story-fn59nm2j-1226975163551, 
accessed 5 July 2014.
17 ‘FBI: Flow of foreign fighters into Syria growing’, Associated Press, 2 May 
2014, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/fbi-flow-foreign-fighters-syria-growing, 
accessed 6 June 2014.
Sectarian violence: the threat to Australia 9
travelled to Syria to fight.18 These concerns have 
been heightened after a returned fighter from Syria 
was arrested for an attack on a Jewish Museum in 
Belgium in May 2014 that left three people dead.19  
The fear regarding the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts, 
however, is merely the latest episode of a campaign 
that has been ongoing for more than a decade. In 
Spain, for instance, since the 2004 Madrid train 
bombings, over 470 Islamists have been arrested.20 
In the United Kingdom, between September 2001 
and August 2012 over 1,000 people who identified 
themselves as Muslim were arrested on terrorism-
related offences, 436 of whom were charged.21 
With these figures in mind, it is little wonder that 
security fears about the further radicalisation of small 
elements of the Muslim community are widespread.
The current threat to Australians
There are two aspects to the current fear 
surrounding sectarian violence against Australians; 
the targeting of nationals abroad and the 
possibility of jihadists returning to their home 
countries to carry out attacks on targets they 
perceive as being representative of oppression 
against Muslims. The numbers of Australians 
currently fighting in Syria and possibly Iraq have 
certainly heightened that fear. It is difficult to 
know, however, the extent to which these jihadists 
fighting overseas constitute an immediate threat.
What data there is on the subject is usually drawn 
from a study of Thomas Hegghammer’s that 
estimated one in nine Muslims who had participated 
18 ‘MI5 focuses on British jihadists returning from Syria’, Financial Times, 14 
March 2014.
19 ‘Jewish museum attack: More checks on Syria fighters needed’, Flanders 
News, 2 June 2006, http://www.deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws.english/
News/1.1986303, accessed 6 June 2014.
20 ‘Six terrorists arrested in Spain raids, Agence France Press, 30 May 2014, 
http://m.thelocal.es//20140530/spain-terrorrist-cell-melilla-mujao-mali-lybia, 
accessed 1 June 2014.
21 ‘Terrorism arrests – analysis of charging and sentencing outcomes by religion’, 
UK Home Office, 12 September 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/terrorism-arrests-analysis-of-charging-and-sentencing-outcomes-
by-religion/terrorism-arrests-analysis-of-charging-and-sentencing-outcomes-
by-religion, accessed 1 June 2014. These numbers are likely well under-
reported given that religious affiliation is self-reported and there is no obligation 
on either the individual or authorities to report an individual’s religious identity. 
During the same period, for example, more than 1,000 people were arrested 
(of whom 347 were charged) whose religion was not known. 
in religiously motivated conflict overseas returned 
to their country of nationality with a willingness 
or the intent to perpetrate attacks against the 
West.22 Even this estimate was considered to 
be relatively loose given the reliance on open-
source data and the uncertainty in determining 
the exact number of Western passport holders 
who had gone to fight overseas. Based solely 
on this study, the threat to Australia from Syrian 
returnees would appear to be slight; in absolute 
numbers perhaps less than 10 known fighters 
may harbour the intent to attack Western targets 
on their departure from Syria and Iraq. 
The reality is that Australians are more likely to be 
the victim of sectarian violence overseas. In some 
cases, such as the 9/11 attacks, it is because 
they were simply caught in a mass attack on 
symbols of the West, symbols that are conflated 
with concepts of Western oppression and unbelief. 
In other cases, Australians have been specifically 
targeted because of their non-Muslim identity: 
Australian citizens have been killed by Indonesian 
Muslim extremists in the Bali and Jakarta bombings; 
by British-born ethnic Pakistanis in London; by 
Saudis in attacks on the residential compounds 
in Riyadh; and by Somalis in the September 2013 
Westgate shopping mall attacks in Nairobi.  
Solutions to this security challenge are tremendously 
difficult. To begin with, it is a global problem, but 
because it has local relevance it needs to be 
addressed at both levels. The relative newness of 
the phenomena means that there is little data to go 
on regarding how likely it is that Australian citizens 
who have decamped to Syria, Iraq or elsewhere 
will ever return to Australia. The research that has 
been completed on European foreign fighters in 
Syria indicates that few have any clear ambition to 
return to Europe once they leave, believing either 
that they will die as martyrs or live in the khilafa they 
believe they will establish.23 The reality, however, 
22 Thomas Hegghammer, ‘Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in 
Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting’, American 
Political Science Review, February 2013, p 10.
23 ‘Jihad by social media’, Financial Times, 26 March 2014, http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/2/907fd41c-b53c-11e3-af92-00144feabdc0.html, accessed 30 May 
2014.
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has been somewhat different, as evidenced by 
the Belgian case and recent media reports that 
claim Australian security authorities are aware of 
and are monitoring 10–20 returnees. Others will 
inevitably return, including some about whom 
the security services likely will remain unaware. 
One other aspect of global jihad that marks it as 
different from other instances of sectarian security 
threats is its multi-ethnic nature. Muslims who 
have been convicted of planning terrorist attacks 
in Australia—who have gone to fight in Syria, 
or who have come to the attention of security 
authorities once in the orbit of Islamic terrorist 
groups overseas—have come from a variety of 
ethnic backgrounds. Although dominated by 
those of Lebanese descent, those convicted of 
terrorist plots in Australia have Lebanese, Somali, 
Bosnian, Algerian and Anglo-Celtic backgrounds. 
Those known to have travelled to Syria to fight 
and have subsequently been killed have included 
Australian citizens of Lebanese and Turkish 
ethnicity. The two Australian citizens killed in a 
US drone strike in April this year—allegedly in the 
company of Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula  
(AQAP) militants—were Anglo-Celtic converts. 
In other words, their religious identity has not 
only overridden their national identity, it has also 
provided a bond between individuals of disparate 
ethnicities. Their primary identity is a religious 
one, and their motivation to attack civilian targets 
is based on an ideological construct in which the 
world is divided into believers—Muslims, but only 
of the schools of thought they agree with—and 
unbelievers, who may be killed in accordance with 
God’s will. This type of sectarian security threat 
has no precedence in Australian history, and it 
is little wonder that it has proven difficult for the 
government to address. What it also means is that 
unless this phenomenon is properly addressed, 
Syria and Iraq may not be the last theatres of war 
that Australian Muslims feel a duty to participate 
in. The Middle East and North Africa have never 
been as open to the violent expression of one’s 
sectarian identity as now. Given the proliferation 
of senior jihadist leaders who cut their teeth in 
sectarian struggles in the region in the 1990s, the 
current situation is quite possibly spawning not only 
a new generation of jihadist leaders, but perhaps 
more importantly a new global support network.24
Australian governments have adopted a multi-layered 
approach to the issue of Australians suspected 
of being sectarian security risks. One element is 
punitive and responsive, cancelling the passports of 
Australian citizens wishing to travel overseas who are 
deemed at risk of fighting or receiving military training 
overseas.25 Another element involves prosecuting 
people found to have participated in, or facilitated 
the participation of others in the Syrian conflict. 
Other more extreme measures have been proposed, 
such as cancelling the Australian citizenship of dual 
citizens who go overseas to fight. The Independent 
National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM) has 
even recommended that in light of the current 
situation regarding foreign fighters, the entire 
concept of dual citizenship should be reconsidered.26 
The second branch of government strategy has been 
preventative. Since 2011, more than $5 million has 
been allocated as part of the Building Community 
Resilience grants program as part of its broader 
Countering Violent Extremism strategy.27 The degree 
to which it has succeeded depends on whether 
one adopts an absolute or relative measure: on the 
one hand the numbers of Australians who have 
continued to travel overseas to fight in the name of 
their religion would indicate that the program has 
failed to achieve its aim; on the other hand, without 
such programs its supporters could argue that 
the problem would be worse than it currently is. 
Some commentators have suggested establishing 
a rehabilitation program for people returning from 
24 Anthony Bubalo, Next-gen jihad in the Middle East, Lowy Institute for 
International Policy Analysis, March 2014, p 6.
25 ASIO cancels passports of Muslim men ‘over jihad war fears’, 8 December 
2013, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-12-08/asio-cancels-passports-of-
muslim-men/5142884, accessed 8 June 2014.
26 Fourth annual report of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, 
28 March 2014, p. 51, http://www.dpmc.gov.au/INSLM/index.cfm, accessed 
23 June 2014.
27 Attorney-General’s Department website, http://www.ag.gov.au/
NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/Pages/default.aspx, accessed 3 
June 2014.
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Syria after fighting there.28 While this may have 
some merit, it is important that the primacy of the 
state and its legal foundation not only be reinforced, 
but be seen to be reinforced. Returnees and their 
facilitators should be prosecuted wherever there is 
enough evidence to do so. Only then can attempts 
at de-radicalisation and/or reintegration be instituted. 
While such programs sound attractive, caution 
should be urged as their degree of success is 
limited.29 Efforts in the United Kingdom with such 
programs began in 200830 and, given the rate of 
arrests of Islamists planning terrorist incidents or 
traveling to Syria and Iraq, there is little indication 
that they have successfully influenced the target 
audience. The recidivism rate for detainees is also 
significant: nearly 30 percent of all detainees from 
Guantanamo Bay are suspected of, or confirmed 
to have been involved in terrorist activities after 
their transfer out of US custody.31 Rehabilitation 
programs such as these also only target the 
symptoms of the problem rather than the cause.
It is the persistence even more than the scale 
of this sectarian security threat that poses the 
greatest challenge for authorities. Given that those 
who represent a sectarian security threat have 
placed their religious above their national identity, 
government-sponsored preventative programs 
will only have limited appeal. Successful efforts 
to delegitimise forms of religious identity and 
interpretation that pose a security threat come 
from the community as a whole, and the Islamic 
religious leadership in particular. Even here there are 
limitations though. Islam’s interpretive nature and 
the lack of a single structured religious hierarchy, 
means that small groups of Muslims can forsake 
mainstream mosques that preach tolerance in 
28 ‘Foreign Fighters in Syria and the challenges of reintegration’, ASPI Strategist, 
13 May 2014, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/foreign-fighters-in-syria-and-
the-challenges-of-reintegration/, accessed 7 June 2014.
29 ‘Fighting terrorism: do de-radicalisation camps really work?’, The Guardian, 
10 June 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/terrorism-do-
deradicalisation-camps-work, accessed 7 June 2014.
30 ‘New plan to tackle violent extremism’, The Guardian, 3 June 2008, 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jun/03/uksecurity.islam, accessed 7 
June 2014.
31 Spinning how many Guantanamo detainees have returned to the fight’, 
Washington Post, 21 November 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/fact-checker/wp/2013/11/21/spinning-how-many-guantanamo-
detainees-have-returned-to-the-fight/, accessed 7 July 2014.
favour of small, secretive or makeshift prayer halls 
that are difficult to monitor, and within which a more 
aggressive brand of anti-Western religious guidance 
can be imparted from poorly qualified imams. 
Increasingly the internet also provides an online 
conduit for the same heterodox line of thought.
Regardless of these challenges, senior religious 
figures as responsible civic leaders must be both 
pro-active and forthright in discouraging and 
disputing notions that offer religious justification for 
putative fighters or returnees’ actions, regardless of 
where they fought or trained, who they fought for, or 
what group they joined. In the battle for ideas there 
is no room for equivocation, whether it is by blaming 
radicalisation on Western governments’ international 
policies rather than an individual’s own choice, failing 
to repudiate claims that foreign fighters were simply 
providing humanitarian assistance, or supporting the 
idea that people who seek to join sectarian conflicts 
overseas are guilty of religiously misguided rather 
than religiously prohibited and criminal actions.  
Equivocation provides those who seek to influence 
others a point of difference between the country’s 
secular and the community’s religious leaders. By 
forthrightly, publicly and pro-actively delegitimising 
the conceptual foundations of fighting for non-state 
actors on religious grounds, community leaders 
will be seen as doing their utmost to separate 
religion from concepts of armed resistance.  
The tardy and equivocal response of the Islamic 
communal leadership to the Syrian situation has 
not assisted government authorities. The National 
Imams Consultative Forum issued guidance32 on the 
Syrian situation advising Australians against travelling 
to Syria to take part in the fighting, noting that it 
was against Australian law to take part in fighting 
with either side and that it was against Islamic 
law to attack civilians and non-combatants. While 
welcome, this statement was neither unequivocal 
nor timely. It advised Australians against travelling 
to Syria to fight, but did not forbid them, it stated 
that joining either side was against Australian law, 
32 NICF Statement regarding the Syrian crisis, http://nceis.unimelb.edu.au/__
data/assets/pdf_file/0006/969603/NICF_Statement_on_Syria_March_2014_1.
pdf, accessed 31 May 2014.
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but made no mention of the Islamic legal view 
of doing so; nor did it mention how Islamic law 
considered foreign fighters killing combatants in 
Syria. The guidance was also not issued until March 
2014, over 18 months after Mustapha al-Majzoub 
became the first Australian killed in Syria in August 
2012. Australia’s Sunni mufti Sheikh Ibrahim Abu 
Mohammad has allegedly maintained a studied 
silence on the issue of people fighting in Syria,33 
and there has been no public comment on the 
sectarian nature of the fighting in Iraq, nor has there 
been an active, sustained and public condemnation 
of Australians who seek to travel and fight there. 
In the absence of any condemnation from the mufti, 
or in the face of such equivocal guidance from the 
forum, impressionable Muslims are more likely to 
seek ways of supporting people who they consider 
to be their brethren fighting overseas. The head of 
the NSW Police counterterrorism unit has recently 
criticised the lack of understanding amongst the 
Australian Muslim community of the potential 
security threat posed by its members taking part 
in Syria’s largely sectarian conflict.34 The Australian 
National Imams Council rejected his claim.35 
The Islamic community’s religious leaders need to 
be alert to the reality that foreign fighters and/or 
facilitators have the potential to carry out or support 
attacks anywhere in the world that could result in the 
deaths of Australian citizens. They could also serve 
as facilitators or recruiters for future conflict in other 
theatres. There needs to be a concerted communal 
effort to engage the Australian community at the 
earliest stages of a conflict that may have religious 
overtones, and to actively discourage civilians’ 
involvement in foreign conflicts on the basis of their 
religious identity. The Islamic community leadership 
could benefit from the development and retention 
of professional media skills equivalent to those 
33 ‘Muslim leaders hold closed meetings with police to discuss Syria law’, 
http://m.abc.net.au/local/article/id/254574/c/3/p/Muslim+leaders+hold+closed
+meetings+with+police+to+discuss+Syria+law, accessed 31 May 2014.
34 ‘Muslim community ‘too lax’ on jihad threat,’ The Australian, http://www.
theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/policy/muslim-community-too-lax-on-
jihad-risk/story-e6frg8yo-1226935154168#, accessed 31 May 2014.
35 ‘Imams rap police over Syrian war allegations’, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 
June 2014, http://www.smh.com.au/national/imams-rap-police-over-syrian-
war-allegations-20140609-39t7s.html, accessed 7 July 2014.
whose messages they seek to blunt. It is of limited 
use, for example, to rely on mosque sermons, 
newspaper interviews or community discussions to 
enjoin people not to fight in Syria when social media 
is awash with calls to Muslims to fight jihad. The 
religious counter-narrative needs to be delivered in 
the same forums as that of the radical narrative. 
Videos of Australian Muslims fighting with ISIS and 
urging other Australians to fight in Syria and Iraq, 
and of Abu Asma al-Australi, an Australian who 
allegedly became a suicide bomber for Jabhat al-
Nusra, serve as evocative calls to arms and have 
been easily obtainable on the internet. By contrast, 
Australia’s Islamic leaders have failed to engage 
on social media in order to address and invalidate 
the religious justification of these fighters as soon 
as possible after they are released. Without taking 
a proactive stance and being prepared to fight 
the ideological battle publicly, in real time and in a 
way that confronts the Islamists’ jihadist narrative, 
Australia’s Islamic leadership has effectively 
vacated the social media field of battle to radical 
Islamists. The Islamists understand the power of 
technology to a far greater degree and employ it 
much more effectively than does the mainstream 
clerical leadership in Australia and elsewhere.  
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the Muslim 
communities are very supportive of the government’s 
efforts to prevent the spread of religious radicalism 
within the Muslim community. The numbers of 
those radicalised sufficiently or naïve enough to 
join militant Islamist groups and enter Syrian or 
other fields of battle are also small. The intra-
Muslim sectarian conflict that has characterised 
the tensions within the Middle East and the 
fighting within Syria has also been largely absent 
from Australia, a reflection of both the nature of 
our immigration patterns and the attitudes of 
the communities themselves within Australia. 
Islamic community leaders need to take advantage 
of the tolerance of the broader Muslim community 
to expedite the clearest message in as many media 
as possible that there is no religious justification 
for fighting. There can be no room for equivocal 
guidance or delay in countering new calls for 
jihad, nor of relying on older, slower and more 
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deliberate forms of engaging with the issue. Taking 
a civic as well as a religious role in guidance of the 
Australian Islamic community, Islamic leadership is 
in desperate need of understanding the media cycle 
and social media platforms, and of using both to 
debate and disown the radical religious messages 
that to date have been afforded an easy path. 
‘Geographic Australians’ 
and future challenges
Both the persistence and seeming intractability of 
the problem of radical Islamist terrorism centres on 
the issue of identity, and it is a problem that will not 
easily be solved within this generation. For Western 
nations, and particularly for immigrant countries such 
as Australia, the historical difficulty of travel and the 
limited methods by which information could travel 
meant that communities could largely be protected 
from the security impact of external conflicts. 
People who may have fled ethnic or sectarian 
conflict to travel to Australia were forced to distance 
themselves from it, and learned about events in 
their country of origin after time delay through print, 
talking by phone to relatives or friends, or perhaps 
as a result of television footage. In the current 
age of instantaneous communications, it is much 
easier for people to maintain contact with events 
in their country of origin or that of their parents, 
and to see near-instantaneous images of conflict.
This has led some senior national security officials 
involved in counterterrorism to talk about the 
emergence of ‘geographic Australians’; those 
who live in the country and take advantage of 
the services that it provides, but who hold an 
identity that is at odds and occasionally in conflict 
with secular Australia. The proliferation of social 
media and consequent speed of information flows 
has meant that it is increasingly easy to become 
a ‘geographic Australian’. This applies to small 
sections of the Islamic community, the members 
of which, like millions of immigrants before them, 
tend to cluster in linguistic or ethnically similar areas. 
Unlike many other groups, however, there are low 
rates of exogamous marriages among Muslim 
families. Such interfaith marriages largely break 
down communal barriers and soften communal 
identity and, as demographers have found, ‘may 
be considered a sign of advanced secularization.’36 
Muslim communities have the lowest rate of interfaith 
marriage in Australia, although this should be 
tempered by the fact that, while rates of exogamous 
marriage increase with second and third-generation 
immigrants, there were relatively smaller numbers 
of these within the Muslim community at the time of 
the 2006 census, on which the figures are based.
Regardless, ready access to social media allied with 
geographic insularity and endogamous marriage 
patterns can provide an atmosphere in which anti-
Western radicalism develops amongst this sub-strata 
of the Islamic community. Particularly for those 
with a relatively poor level of secular education, 
a lack of contestability of ideas from interaction 
with broader society, and disconnection from the 
host country, through reliance on social media 
individuals can construct a narrative in which they 
believe there is a global assault on their religion 
that they are ideologically bound to defend. For 
some that may mean a desire to travel to foreign 
battlefronts; for others it means a desire to fight 
the ‘near enemy’ at home. For both it represents a 
potential security challenge for the host country.
It is likely that over time demographic changes will 
alter the Muslim community’s marriage patterns 
and make interfaith and interethnic marriages 
increasingly common. On the other hand, the 
increasingly easy access to uncontextualised 
social media will continue to act as a means by 
which disaffected, religiously observant youth 
can immerse themselves in what they perceive 
to be a viable, antagonistic alternative to secular 
society. Attempting to avoid the long-term security 
implications of ‘geographic Australians’ is further 
justification for communal and religious leaders 
to be proactive in providing counter-narratives to 
those readily available to individuals who have yet 
to integrate fully into the society in which they live. 
36 Genevieve Heard, Siew-Ean Khoo & Bob Birrell, Intermarriage in Australia: 
patterns by birthplace, ancestry, religion and indigenous status, Centre for 
Population and Urban Research, Monash University, June 2009, p. 30, 
http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/cpur/files/2012/09/intermarriage-report.pdf, 
accessed 31 May 2014.
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The future
Fears of sectarian security threats and instances of 
Australians travelling overseas to fight in civil wars 
or for non-state actors are not new in Australian 
experience. The current type of security threat, 
however, is qualitatively different from those of 
the past. Australia’s experience with sectarianism 
was previously one in which religious affiliation 
comprised part of a broader—usually nationalist—
identity. The sectarian conflict that past Australians 
have confronted essentially concerned unresolved 
borders and issues of political representation. 
Frequently issues of religious affiliation were about 
issues of political rather than religious ideology.
Despite the government’s recognition of the threat 
that radical Islamism represents for Australians 
both at home and abroad, the programs that it 
has instituted have failed to address the issue 
adequately. More than a decade after the 11 
September 2001 attacks in the United States, the 
threat not only persists but has grown. Australian 
citizens have continued to pursue the chimera of 
a religiously motivated but unachievable outcome 
through the use of violence. Due largely to the 
situation in Syria and now Iraq, there are likely 
more Australians who have had contact with—and 
training by—militant Islamic groups than there were 
before the so-called Global War on Terror began.  
Most Australians who have fought in Syria have no 
Syrian ancestry, and many are not ethnically Arab. 
They have no links with the country except for the 
belief that they share a religious identity demanding 
that they take up arms to protect their own ‘imagined 
community’ community. The concern for Australian 
authorities is that this ‘imagined community’ is 
not confined to Syria or Iraq and that they may 
return to Australia to undertake terrorist actions, 
or to support like-minded individuals or groups in 
launching operations in other countries that target 
what they perceive to be non-Muslim interests.  
Solutions to this are not easy. To begin with, the 
government and communal leadership must 
identify ways in which to protect its citizens against 
a sectarian threat that has killed more than 100 of 
them over the past 13 years, and plotted attacks 
in Australia. The stronger legislative measures that 
are being touted are a good start but they are 
punitive and do nothing to address the ideological 
motivation for people to pursue a radical path. The 
persistence of the threat indicates that punitive and 
government preventative measures (even more 
rigorous ones) alone are by themselves insufficient.  
One thing that the Syrian issue has demonstrated 
is that people’s access to information around 
which they can construct an identity that allows 
them to disengage from mainstream thought has 
never been greater. As a consequence, Muslim 
community leaders have the greatest responsibility 
for defeating the ideological component that is 
fuelling the threat to Australian nationals. If the 
secular government and its policy approach to 
conflicts that involve Muslim populations have 
already been delegitimised in the perceptions of 
militant Islamists, then it is left to the sectarian 
leadership to engage vigorously—via all platforms 
and at the earliest opportunity—to delegitimise 
participation in conflict not sanctioned by the state. 
While intra-communal spillover from distant conflict 
appears to have been dealt with in a responsible 
and professional way by community leaders, in the 
case of Syria and Iraq it is reasonable to say that 
the Islamic counter-narrative that has been publicly 
disseminated by the community’s leadership has 
been too little in too few communications media, and 
demonstrably too late. The community’s leadership 
appears to be fighting this twenty-first century 
ideological battle with a twentieth-century approach.
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